Reconstructing the Definition of Hearsay by Weissenberger, Glen
Reconstructing the Definition of Hearsay
GLEN WEISSENBERGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Evidence professors seem to have a pathological compulsion to scrutinize
and reorder the hearsay system.1 Like the compulsive behavior of a person who
* Judge Joseph P. Kinneary Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati.
1 See Michael H. Graham, "Stickperson Hearsay": A Simplified Approach to
Understanding the Rule Against Hearsay, 1982 U. IhL. L. REv. 887 (employing a heuristic
device to present a change in the form of the definition of hearsay and offering a simplified
method of understanding the hearsay rule); Edward J. linwinkelried, The Constitutionalization
of Hearsay: The Etent to Which the Fifth and Sisth Amendments Permit or Require the
Liberalization of the Hearsay Rules, 76 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1992) (discussing the degree to
which the Constitution permits and requires liberalization of the hearsay rules); John M.
Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REv. 741
(1961) (describing "characteristic defects" of hearsay in the evidentiary system and proposing
a "functioning definition of hearsay"); Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modem Hearsay
Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MrNN. L. REv. 367 (1992) (discussing modem
and post-modem criticisms of, and proposals for, reform and suggesting an approach
designed to lead to better understanding of hearsay); Roger C. Park, A Subject Matter
Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MIcH. L. REv. 51 (1987) [hereinafter Park I] (arguing that
the Federal Rules of Evidence should be modified to address issues that arise in criminal, but
not civil, cases); Roger C. Park, "I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You": Implied
Assertions as Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L. REv. 783 (1990)
[hereinafter Park 1] (evaluating the preference of hearsay scholars for a declarant-oriented
definition of hearsay and concluding that change from the assertion-oriented definition in the
Rules to a declarant-oriented definition would not be desirable in light of cases applying the
Rules to implied assertions); Paul R. Rice, Should Unintended Implications of Speech Be
Considered Nonhearsay? The Assertive/Nonassertive Distinction Under Rule 801(a) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 529 (1992) (arguing that all speech carries a
danger of insincerity and that as a result all inferences from direct assertions should be
considered to carry a danger of insincerity); David E. Seidelson, Implied Assertions and
Federal Rule of Evidence 801: A Quandary for Federal Courts, 24 DUQ. L. REv. 741 (1986)
(highlighting the Advisory Committee note to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a) and
advocating rejection of its purported contention that implied assertions should be treated as
nonhearsay); Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto by
Judicial Decision?, 76 MINN. L. REv. 473 (1992) (surveying the application of the hearsay
system and discussing possible results if the hearsay rule were liberalized); Glen
Weissenberger, Unintended Implications of Speech and the Definition of Hearsay, 65 TEMP.
L. REv. 857 (1992) [hereinafter Weissenberger, Unintended Implications] (arguing that an
implied assertion based on a statement that cannot be true or false should be admissible); Olin
Guy Wellborn III, The Definition of Hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 TEx. L.
REV. 49 (1982) (concluding that Rule 801 should be revised and proposing amendments to
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cannot leave home without checking whether each appliance is turned off, and
then agonizes about whether each appliance was checked after he or she has left
home, evidence professors cannot resist an inner need to turn their scholarly
minds to the examination and reexamination of the byzantine structure of the
law of hearsay. Of necessity, we evidence professors develop such an intimacy
with the theory and application of the hearsay system that we are tormented by
dissonance between its underlying policies and its application. Consequently,
because we struggle to master an intractable hearsay system in order to teach it
to our students, it is only natural that at some point in our lives as scholars, we
want to rebuild the system we are compelled to master beyond any conceivable
purpose except to teach it to other people. 2 Professor Wellbom said it best:
"Nearly every important scholar in the field of evidence, and many a lesser
one, has written on the problem of the scope of the hearsay rule. " 3 It is
probably not because evidence professors are by nature reformers. Rather, for
most of us, it is probably because hearsay bothers us on some deep level where
our need for intellectual order originates.
In this Article I unabashedly succumb to the compulsion to write about the
problem of the scope of the hearsay rule. Nevertheless, my surrender to this
compulsion is tempered by a mature realization that scholarship on hearsay may
be more therapeutic for the author than for the audience. Consequently, before
suggesting new approaches to the hearsay system, this Article begins in Part II
by first examining the lessons that may be learned from others who have turned
their minds to hearsay. Then, in Part I, this Article examines the nature of the
problem presented by the hearsay definition. In Part IV, this Article offers a
reform of the hearsay system that does not seek to recast the analytic qualities
of the hearsay system, but rather reorders the rhetorical process involved in
applying the hearsay system. As the lessons derived from previous scholarship
teach, the problem with hearsay lies less in its theoretical attributes than in the
rhetorical logic employed in addressing hearsay issues. In Part V of this Article,
the reader will find the necessary but inescapably boring discussion of possible
problems presented by my proposed reform. The reader, however, is
encouraged to persevere, because my conclusion may be somewhat surprising.
address difficulties identified in the hearsay system).
Other distinguished authors have scrutinized the hearsay system in treatises and texts.
See GRAHAM C. ILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EviDENCE (2d ed. 1987);
CHARLEs T. McCORMICK, McCORIcK ON EVIDENCE (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); 4
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINsEIN's EVIDENCE (1993).
2 See sources cited supra note 1.
3 Wellborn, supra note 1, at 58.
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II. HEARSAY SCHOLARSHIP AND HEARSAY REALITY
Despite what may be the low level of tolerance among evidence professors
for intellectual disorder, the hearsay system may be working reasonably well in
practice. 4 As evidence professors, few of us have the opportunity of judges to
develop an intuitive sense of whether the system is working effectively. 5 In fact,
some jury studies suggest that the system is not all that bad. 6 Moreover, the
development of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment has created a
body of law that barely diverges from the hearsay system as it is codified in the
Federal Rules of Evidence.7 Of course, the Supreme Court's shaping of the
Confrontation Clause is not itself a test of the soundness of the hearsay system it
tends to mirror.8 Nevertheless, the Court in developing Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence is not constrained by language of the Rules of Evidence nor by
principles of interpretation and construction that apply to the Rules. 9 Despite the
4 Professor Park has been a leading advocate of maintaining the current system,
reasoning that it works "tolerably well" in practice. See Park II, supra note 1, at 838; see also
Peter Miene et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76
MINN. L. REv. 683, 698-99 (1992) (arguing that jurors properly assess the weight of hearsay
testimony); Park I, supra note 1.
5 Although professors may lack the opportunity to gain this intuitive sense, this has not
prevented us from pointing out the failures of the system. See, e.g., Wellborn, supra note 1,
at 66-92 (criticizing the Federal Rules' definition and offering a proposal for reform); see also
Rice, supra note 1, at 533-34; Seidelson, supra note 1, at 754-75.
6 See Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay
Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REv. 703 (1992); Meine et al., supra note 4, at 698-99.
7 See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805
(1990); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387
(1986); see also Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REv. 557, 557-58
(1992) (discussing relegation of the Confrontation Clause to mere evidentiary importance);
Imwinkelried, supra note 1 (focusing on hearsay issues in analyzing Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence); Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine
Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 709-62
(analyzing Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence); Charles R. Nesson & Yochai
Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundational Testing and Corroboration Under
the Confrontation Clause, 81 VA. L. REV. 149, 158-62 (1995) (asserting that the analysis by
the Supreme Court equates hearsay with confrontation and results in incoherent constitutional
rules); David E. Seidelson, The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court: From "Faded
Parchment" to Slough, 3 WmENm J. PuB. L. 477, 478-80 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme
Court treats the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule as congruent).
8 See sources cited supra note 7 (showing how the hearsay system has been treated as a
guideline for the Court's analysis of the Confrontation Clause).
9 For a discussion of the issues surrounding the interpretation of the Federal Rules of
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opportunity that Confrontation Clause jurisprudence provides in affording a
second look at the values of the hearsay system in criminal prosecutions, the
analysis in cases construing the Confrontation Clause does not even suggest a
misalignment of underlying values and specific rules in the functioning federal
hearsay system. 10
In truth, as evidence professors, most of us know very little about the way
the hearsay system functions and affects participants and results. 11 In
advocating reform, we are not inclined to argue, even anecdotally, on the basis
of any factually-based dysfunction. Rather, we are more likely to argue that it is
a system in need of reconstruction, mainly because its internal qualities are
Evidence, see Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the Supreme Court's Approach to
the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 IND. L. REv. 267 (1993); Glen
Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
53 OmIo ST. L.J. 1307, 1311-38 (1992); see also Glen Weissenberger, The Former
Testimony Hearsay Exception: A Study in Rulemalang, Judicial Revisionism, and the
Separation of Powers, 67 N.C. L. REv. 295, 302-11, 318-35 (1989).
10 See Berger, supra note 7, at 592-605 (detailing the history of Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence and the alignment with the hearsay rule). In Wright, the Supreme Court stated
that "hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar
values." Wright, 497 U.S. at 814. In White, the Court explained that "where proffered
hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied." White, 502 U.S. at 356. Nevertheless,
according to Professor Berger, "the Court's evidentiary approach ignores a supporting role
for the Confrontation Clause in restraining the capricious use of governmental power."
Berger, supra note 7, at 560. Confrontation by cross-examination is not simply a means of
obtaining reliable evidence for the factfinder to rely upon in reaching a decision. Although
confrontation does promote fairness and accuracy, scholars argue that it also should be used to
keep in check the advantage over the defendant that the prosecution derives from the
government in criminal trials. See id. at 561. According to Professor Berger, the
"Confrontation Clause should bar hearsay statements elicited by governmental agents unless
the declarant is produced at trial or unless special procedures... are followed." Id. at 561-
62. The Court's focus on the reliability of hearsay rather than the Bill of Rights guarantee of
confrontation does not recognize the value of confrontation which "enables the public to
scrutinize the process by which the government obtains and uses evidence in a criminal trial."
Id. at 562. See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 1; Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional
Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76
MINN. L. REv. 623 (1992).
11 As theorists, evidence professors tend to ignore or remain ignorant of the practical
application of the system as it is employed by judges and litigators. Instead, we seem
preoccupied with the subtle nuances abundant in the Rules' syntax. See Ronald J. Bacigal,
Implied Hearsay: Diffusing the Battle Line Between Pragmatism and Theory, 11 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 1127, 1127 (1987) (noting that pragmatists are often bored with academicians'
"metaphysical musings unrelated to 'real life' situations").
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incoherently misaligned. 12 Perhaps what we are really saying is that this is an
integrally flawed system because we have had a perfectly miserable time
teaching this system to extremely intelligent and moderately motivated people
who are reasonably focused on the task of learning it. Imagine, we implicitly
argue, how this system must function in a world of lawyers and judges where
there is no evidence professor to guide the discussion. 13
I am not arguing that the body of literature scrutinizing hearsay is without
value. 14 Putting aside potentially judgmental concerns about how one expends
one's intellectual energy, there is no question that there are instances where
scholarly articles on hearsay have had an authentic impact on the law. 15 Also,
insights contained in this literature inform and stimulate the ongoing evaluation
of the hearsay system, a scholarly process in which evidence professors must
12 See sources cited supra note 1; see also Roger C. Park, Foreword: The Hearsay
Reform Conference-The New Wave of Hearsay Reform Scholarship, 76 MINN. L. REv. 363,
363-66 (1992) [hereinafter Park, Foreword] (discussing the resurgence of the critical
evaluation of the core issues of the hearsay policy).
13 See James W. McElhaney, It's Not for Its Truth, 77 A.B.A. J. 80 (1991). Professor
McElhaney provides a supposedly fictional example of a judge's misunderstanding of the
hearsay system and its application:
Oh, he [the judge] can recite the magic words [not offered for its truth] ... but that
doesn't mean he really understands them. If the other side objects to your evidence as
hearsay all you have to say is, "It's not for its truth, your honor," and Judge Feclder will
overrule the objection. It works every time.
Id. at 80.
14 My purpose is to highlight the deficiency of practical suggestions designed to assist
lawyers and judges in properly analyzing out-of-court statements. A proposed solution which
would address this need is discussed infra notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., Tax. R. EvID. 801. The influence of Professor Wellborn on the Texas
Rules' departure from Federal Rule 801 is dramatic. See Wellborn, supra note 1, at 92
(offering a proposal for a new definition); Olin Guy Wellborn III, Article VIII: Hearsay, 30
Hous. L. REv. 897, 903-16 (1993) [hereinafter Wellborn, Article VIII: Hearsay] (comparing
Texas Rule 801 and Federal Rule 801). Professor Wellborn argued that Federal Rule 801
should be revised because "the rule's attempt to confine the verbal hearsay concept strictly to
'assertions' that are 'offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted' will simply
not work in practice, because it mandates unnatural, hair-splitting, semantic distinctions and
unsound, arbitrary results.... " Wellborn, supra note 1, at 52. The impact of Wellborn's
scholarship is clear in the revised Texas rule which provides that "'matter asserted' includes
not only explicit assertions but also 'any matter implied by a statement' if its probative value
depends upon the declarant's belief in the implied assertion." Wellborn, Article Ul7.
Hearsay, supra, at 906-07.
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maintain a modicum of faith. 16 Nevertheless, we rarely can calculate the
ultimate effect of the publication of intricate analyses or simple insights.
Consequently, while hearsay scholars undoubtedly hope that their writing vl
have some impact, 17 rarely is it possible to gauge whether it does or does not.18
What appears to be the case, however, is this: there is a great deal of writing
advocating hearsay reform, and, simultaneously, there is very little palpable
change. 19 If this observation about the impact of scholarly literature on trials,
judges, and lawyers is correct, there are a few possible explanations. A
nonexhaustive list might include: first, hearsay scholars want to change a
system that others do not see the need to repair;20 second, hearsay scholars
have not made cogent or comprehensible arguments for change; 21 third,
nobody takes evidence professors very seriously. Nevertheless, if I were to
offer my best speculation as to why large-scale hearsay reform has not
occurred, I would suggest that it is because, generally, procedural rules in a
legal system do not undergo significant change except in the context of crisis,
and no reality-based crisis has occurred. 22 In any event, in light of the rarity of
16 See generally AN EVIDENCE ANTHOLOGY (Edward J. Imwinkelried & Glen
Weissenberger eds., 1996); Roger C. Park, Evidence Scholarship, Old and New, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 849 (1991).17 See supra note 14.
18 See Maguire, supra note 1, at 777-78 (discussing possibility of despair among
reformists due to lack of change in hearsay system); Park, Foreword, supra note 12, at 363-
64 (noting the discouragement of the reformists from the apparent lack of responsive action by
the rule's advisory committee).
19 There have, in fact, been no substantive amendments to Federal Rule 801(a)-(c) since
its adoption in 1975.
20 See Park II, supra note 1, at 838 (arguing that the hearsay system works "tolerably
well" in practice); cf Wellborn, supra note 1 (advocating a need for change).
21 See, e.g., Glen Weissenberger, Hearsay Puzzles: An Essay on Federal Evidence Rule
803(3), 64 TEMP. L. REV. 145 (1991) [hereinafter Weissenberger, Hearsay Puzzles];
Weissenberger, Unintended Implications, supra note 1.
22 See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense
Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 560-83 (1994); see also Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of
1994 and the Law of Character Evidence: Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases,
22 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 271 (1995) [hereinafter Park, The Crime Bill of 1994]. While
acknowledging the policies behind the rule excluding character evidence, Roger Park recently
wrote in support of carving out a narrow exception that would admit evidence of other sexual
assaults in sex crime cases in which the defendant raises a defense of consent. See id. at 271-
72. Responding to concerns that the exclusion of relevant character evidence was resulting in
acquittals of sex offenders, Congress recently created exceptions which allow evidence of an
offense of sexual assault or child molestation to be admitted. See FED. R. EviD. 413-415.
According to Professor Park, "When a rule of exclusion flies in the face of common sense
and is based on dubious generalizations about the danger of misdecision, it does not take
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traceable real world reactions to hearsay literature, it may be inefficient and
positively deflating to spend time advocating reform that is not destined to be
accepted. This may be reason enough not to give in to the compulsion to write
about reconstructing the hearsay system.23
Advocating change in the hearsay system, however, may serve a modest,
but more realistic function. Rather than advancing change with the expectation
that change might actually occur, a scholar may advocate change as a means of
illuminating certain problematic aspects of the existing system.24 The best way
to assist in the navigation of an intricate pathway may be to demonstrate the
ways in which the path might be redirected.25 Such a discussion would not only
identify problems in the system, but it would simultaneously provide some
insight into whether the problems are of sufficient magnitude to justify the cost
of teaching a new system to those who would actually use the results of the
reform. It is this metaphoric function which may best serve to improve the
hearsay system.26 It is also the spirit in which this particular discussion
proceeds. 27
much to justify an exception that will let the trier hear more of the relevant data." Park, The
Crime Bill of 1994, supra, at 272. Park urges an exception which would apply only in the
specific context of consent defense cases while Rules 413-415 apply to all sexual assault and
child molestation cases. See id.
23 See Park, Foreword, supra note 12, at 363-66 (noting the reformists' sense of
futility).
24 Accordingly, it is not the purpose of this Article to supplant the framework of Rule
801, but to provide a more intelligible organization of the intentions of Rule 801.
25 Many of the authors cited in this Article have offered their own concrete proposals for
a more workable system. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 1, at 920-23 (reformulating the Rule
801(c) definition of hearsay); Maguire, supra note 1, at 768-73 (proposing reform of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence); Wellborn, supra note 1, at 92 & n.191 (offering a proposal for a
new definition).
26 For it must be that the primary goal of our theoretical discourse is to illuminate the
deficiencies of the hearsay system in an effort to make it more practical for the people who
actually rely on it-judges and litigators.27 Likewise, this discussion proceeds with a style of prose that is, by design, less dense
than that in many law review articles. To quote Anthony D'Amato:
mhe choice of style is quite deliberate. For I believe that the most elusive and hardest
ideas are best tackled by the simplest and most direct kind of prose. This is in large part
a reaction to my frustration over the years in reading "heavy" prose which often,
because of its convoluted style (such as the use of third-person, passive tense, and overly
long sentences), turns out to be ambiguous. When the subject of an article is difficult, the
last thing we need is an ambiguous analysis of it. The simpler the prose, the more naked
are the ideas expressed in support of the author's conclusion. I hope to convey precisely
what I mean, and if there is illogic or incoherence in what I say, it will be exposed to
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My self-ordained mission here is not to propose a massive reconstruction of
the essential qualities of the hearsay system. 28 Likewise, I do not see gross
injustice wrought by our hearsay system; consequently, I have no passion for
reshaping the values it fosters. 29 Accordingly, I do not propose changes which
would radically change what is admissible, and I do not propose changes that
would make the system fairer. Rather, my reform would be based on what I
know best. I would change the system by making it easier to teach. By "teach,"
I refer not only to the function of a professor in a classroom, but equally I mean
the function of lawyers teaching judges, of judges teaching lawyers, and of
lawyers and judges teaching one another.30 Fundamentally, I would reorder the
system to better organize and direct the rhetoric brought to bear on the issue of
the admissibility of out-of-court statements.
Through the experience of teaching, I have come to believe that a central
problem of the hearsay system, if not the singular problem of greatest
magnitude, is that the evolution of the common law has given contemporary
evidence law an excessively dense and overburdened hearsay definition. 31 The
hearsay definition simply requires too much unpacking every time it is used.
And, of course, it must be unpacked every time the hearsay system is applied.
The definition is simultaneously the threshold consideration in the application of
the hearsay system as well as the core concept which justifies admitting or
excluding out-of-court assertive behavior. 32 As the pivotal concept of the
your scrutiny, not buried in a heavy style.
Anthony D'Amato, On the Connection Between Law and Justice, 26 U.C. DAvis L. REV.
527, 528 (1993).28 See sources cited supra note 25.
2 9 See supra note 14. My purpose is merely to provide lawyers and judges with a more
intelligible framework within which to work.30 To reach this objective, the system must be one that is easily comprehensible to all-
students, lawyers, judges, and not least of all evidence professors. As it stands now, it is easy
to feign understanding and gloss over the wording of Rule 801. See infra notes 82-97 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the proposed reform.
31 Evidence professors will frequently boast about how many class sessions they spend
teaching the deceptively simple appearing, one sentence definition of hearsay contained in
Rule 801(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. For commentary on the evolution of the
complex structure of the hearsay rule and its exceptions, see LILLY, supra note 1, § 7.28;
Ronald . Allen, Commentary: A Response to Professor Friedman-The Evolution of the
Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 MINN. L. REv. 797, 797-802 (1992); Wellbom,
Article VIIh Hearsay, supra note 15, at 900.
32 To this point, reformists' efforts have concentrated on changing the definition of
hearsay while accepting the general framework of the system. See Graham, supra note 1, at
920-23 (revising the hearsay definition in form only, to reflect more accurately the intent of
Rule 801); Maguire, supra note 1, at 768-77 (expanding the definition of hearsay to make the
1532 [Vol. 57:1525
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hearsay system instructs the analysis of every hearsay issue, the definition of
hearsay, in my experience, creates the most far-reaching difficulties in
understanding and applying the hearsay system. If the definition presents these
kinds of difficulties for students in the classroom, it must inevitably inflict
similar discomfort upon lawyers and judges, whether they realize it or not.
Consequently, a threshold reform which would be helpful to the rational
application of the hearsay system, even if offered only as critical metaphor,
would be to reform the unnecessarily dense hearsay definition that is the
hallmark of both the historical and contemporary system. I am not advocating
any real change in the analytic qualities of the definition. Rather, I would recast
the definition to make it more functional and less cryptic in order to facilitate
more. meaningful advocacy about the admissibility of particular items of
evidence.
This discussion proceeds by employing the Federal Rules of Evidence as a
frame of reference. Adopted in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence have
served as a model for many state evidence codes. 33 The provisions of the
Federal Rules primarily pertinent to this discussion are Rules 801 and 802. Rule
801 provides:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) non-
verbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement
is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a
deposition, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to
rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made
after perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by pary-opponent. The statement is offered against a party
intentions of Rule 801 more explicit); Wellborn, supra note 1, at 91-93 (redefining the
definition of statement and hearsay to broaden the exclusionary rule).
33 See, e.g., FLA. R. EviD. 90.801.
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and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative
capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or
belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy. 34
Rule 802, the "Hearsay Rule," provides: "Hearsay is not admissible except
as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."'35 Consequently, under
the federal codification, "hearsay," as defined in Rule 801, is made
inadmissible by Rule 802. Nevertheless, it is subject to exceptions expressly
identified in Rule 802, "Hearsay Rule," and Rule 801(d), "Statements which
are not hearsay."
If one were to invent the hearsay system by simply building upon its
underlying values and objectives, it is doubtful that the result would look
anything like Rule 801 and the accompanying Rules in Article VII of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Like so many things, its structure is a product *of
historical development rather than conscious attention to design, a matter to
which we turn in the next section.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL RULE 801 WHICH CONTAINS THE
DEFINITION OF HEARSAY
The hearsay system codified under the Federal Rules of Evidence is a
direct descendant of the common law.36 A rule excluding hearsay has always
been the cornerstone of the system, with numerous exceptions admitting
hearsay otherwise made inadmissible. The problem with this codification is that
the system will not work unless the users of the system have a common
understanding of exactly what "hearsay" means. This is where the problem
lies: "hearsay" as a construct is complicated, multilayered, and intricate. Also,
34 FED. R. EvID. 801.
35 RED. R. Evm. 802.36 See FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee's note (explaining that Rule 803 is a
"synthesis" of the exceptions developed by the common law "with revision where modem
developments and conditions are believed to make that course appropriate"); 2 McCoRMIcK,
supra note 1, § 244 (describing the history of hearsay at common law); Charles T.
McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489, 504 (1930) (criticizing the
rigidity of the system and predicting change to the discretionary rule); Charles T.
McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A. J. 507, 512 (1938) (same).
1534 [Vol. 57:1525
RECONSTRUCTING HEARSAY
there is debate, at least at the fringes, as to the scope of the definition.37 The
complexity of the definition is illustrated by the fact that every major work on
evidence devotes several pages to discussing what is and what is not
"hearsay."38
During the debate which occurred when the Federal Rules of Evidence
were in their formative stage, some critics of the common law system argued
that the codified rule should be broadened to allow for more judicial discretion
in admitting evidence, and proposals were submitted to the Federal Rules
Advisory Committee urging a less formal approach. 39 Responding to these
proposals, the Committee, in an early draft, did in fact substitute two rather
general exceptions for the specific common law list in its 1969 draft.40 The
proposed exceptions would have provided judges with new found discretion in
deciding that a statement had sufficient "assurances of accuracy" to be
admissible under this proposed version of the Rule, and the admission of
hearsay would not have been based on fitting a statement into such categories as
"dying declaration" or "excited utterance." 41 By the end of the drafting
process, however, the common law system which is comprised of an
exclusionary rule, a hearsay definition, and formal exceptions was left intact;
"with nonformal [i.e. residual] exceptions merely supplementing rather than
supplanting them." 42 Consequently, the hearsay system enacted in 1975 varied
only slightly from the common law, leaving in place a hearsay definition
overburdened by the accretion of layers of common law evolution. 43
In order to understand my suggested reform, it is necessary initially to
37 See sources cited supra note 1.
3 8 See 2 McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, §§ 246, 248-51, at 97-99, 100-24; 4
CHRISTOPmm B. Mumiam & LAmD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EvIDENcE §§ 368-430, at
4-354 (2d ed. 1994); 4 WE[NSmN & BERGER, supra note 1, 801[01]-801(d)(2)[03], at
801-1 to 801-381; GLEN WESSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 801.1-.11, at 385-406 (2d
ed. 1995). In my Article, my treatise gets the status of a "major work."
39 See, e.g., Wellborn, supra note 1, at 54-55 & n.36 (describing the drafting process of
the Advisory Committee).
40 See id. at 54 n.36. Proposed Rule 8-03(a) provided: "A statement is not excluded by
the hearsay rule if its nature and special circumstances under which it was made offer
assurances of accuracy not likely to be enhanced by calling the declarant as a witness, even
though he is available." 46 F.R.D. 161, 345 (1969). Proposed Rule 8-04(a) provided: "A
statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if its nature and the special circumstances under
which it was made offer strong assurances of accuracy and the declarant is unavailable as a
witness." Id. at 377.
41 See Wellborn, supra note 1, at 54-55.
42 Id. at 55; see also FED. R. EviD. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
43 See Park II, supra note 1, at 802-29 (illustrating, through post-1975 caselaw, the
liberal interpretation of the definition with respect to implied assertions).
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appreciate the manifold nature of concepts that are packed into the hearsay
definition. Rule 801(c) defines "hearsay" as a "statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."44 In Rule 801(a), "statement" is defined
as "(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) non-verbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by the person as an assertion." 45 Preliminarily, it should be
appreciated that under the federal system the hearsay definition applies only to
statements, and that not all verbal noises are statements. Likewise, some forms
of nonverbal, soundless conduct may be statements subject to the hearsay
definition.46
Continuing the analysis further, assuming the out-of-court communication
meets the definition of statement, the statement may yet escape the bounds of
the hearsay definition. In Rule 801(c), "hearsay" is defined as an out-of-court
statement offered for its truth.47 Not all out-of-court statements are offered for
their truth, and where an out-of-court statement is not offered for its truth, it is
not made inadmissible by Article VIII. 48 Unfortunately, this critical defining
quality is elusive in regard to some statements. Nevertheless, in regard to
certain types of statements, there is common agreement. For example, some
statements may be admissible nonhearsay because they are offered for their
effect on a particular listener or reader. Statements communicating warnings or
notices or statements offered to show emotional injury inflicted on the listener
are commonly accepted as part of this category of nonhearsay, out-of-court
statements. 49 Similarly, statements which have their own independent legal
significance (often referred to as "verbal acts") are outside the scope of Rule
801(c).50 A common example is an oral or written statement constituting a
44 FED. R. Evm. 801(c).
45 FED. R. Evm. 801(a).
46 See Rice, supra note 1, at 532-36 (arguing against the assertion-oriented approach
adopted by the Rules); Weissenberger, Unintended Implications, supra note 1, at 857-60.
Under the common law, the hearsay rule proscribed evidence which depended upon the
credibility of the out-of-court declarant. This so-called "declarant-based" approach focused on
the source of the evidence in determining its value, rather than on the nature of the statement
itself. See Weissenberger, Unintended Implications, supra note 1, at 858.
47 See FED. R. Evm. 801(c).
4 8 See id.
49 See 2 McCoRMucK, supra note 1, § 249; 4 MuELLER & KRKPATRiCK, supra note 38,
§ 387; 4 WEINSEN & BERGER, supra note 1, 801(c)[01]; WESSENBERGER, supra note 38,
§ 801.7.
5 0 See 2 McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 249; 4 MELLER & KKPATRICK, supra note 38,
§ 385; 4 WEIsNrE & BERGER, supra note 1, 801(c)[01]; WEissENBERGER, supra note 38,
§ 801.8.
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binding agreement.51 Statements which do not directly assert the declarant's
state of mind are also commonly considered to be admissible nonhearsay. A
child's statement, "My father, A, murdered B," is a nonhearsay statement if it
is offered to demonstrate the fearful state of mind of the child with respect to his
father and not to prove that the father is a murderer.52 Finally, prior
inconsistent statements used for impeachment purposes also qualify as
nonhearsay, out-of-court statements because the statements are not offered for
their truth, but are only offered to show that the witness is the type of person
who makes conflicting statements. 53
The categories of nonhearsay, out-of-court statements considered in the
foregoing paragraph, among others, have been traditionally recognized under
the preexisting common law and have continued to be recognized with little
controversy under Federal Rule 801. They are derived from the implicit logic
of the definitional language of Rule 801(a) through (c).54 More controversial is
the treatment of so-called "implied assertions" where the logic is more elusive.
Whether the definition of hearsay in Rule 801 should be applied to implied
assertions at all is a contentious issue among scholars.55 The term "implied
assertion" refers to the derivative message that flows inferentially from the
declarant's primary statement. 56 In terms of relevancy, it is this derivative
message that is important, not the primary utterance. An illustrative and
commonly used example of an implied assertion occurs in a case where it is
relevant to determine whether the place being called is a betting establishment:
a law enforcement officer, in the midst of a raid on the defendant's premises,
picks up a ringing telephone and hears the out-of-court statement, "Put two
dollars on Paul Revere in the third at Pimlico." 57 Offered to show the implied
51 See 2 McCORMICK, supra note 1, § 249; 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38,
§ 385; 4 W srEIN & BERGER, supra note 1, 801(c)[01]; WEtssENBERGER, supra note 38,
§ 801.10.
52 See 4 MUELLER & KRKPATRICK, supra note 38, §§ 389-90; 4 WENsrE & BERGER,
supra note 1, 801(c)[01]; WEssENBERGER, supra note 38, § 801.10.
5 3 See 4 MUELLER & KRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 386; 4 WINsTEN & BERGER,
supra note 1, 806101]; WEIssENBERGER, supra note 38, § 801.11.
54 See FED. R. EviD. 801.
55 It is generally accepted that the assertion-oriented definition of hearsay in Rule 801
and the Advisory Committee's note thereto substantially changed the common law by
excluding implied assertions from the" definition. See Park II, supra note 1, at 810-11, 829-
38; Seidelson, supra note 1, at 766-67; Wellborn, supra note 1, at 64. But see Graham, supra
note 1, at 908-09 (arguing that Rule 801(c) should be interpreted to include implied
assertions).56 See Weissenberger, UnintendedImplications, supra note 1, at 862. See also ineefra note
72 for a chart explaining the concept of implied assertions.
57 See United States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464, 465 (E.D. Ky. 1980). Zenni is also
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belief or message of the caller that he or she is calling a betting establishment,
the evidence is relevant for what it inferentially reveals about the caller's
indirectly or impliedly asserted beliefs. 58 Under contemporary cases, implied
assertions have become a basis for the introduction of out-of-court statements
which would have been classified as hearsay under the common law. 59
In rejecting the common law approach, modem courts have generally
interpreted Rule 801 and the Advisory Committee's note as exempting implied
assertions from the definition of hearsay. 60 The shift in thinking from the
position of the common law reflects a recognition that implied messages are
likely to be accurate because the declarant usually does not intend to assert the
messages that others imply from his or her primary declarations. 61 As a result,
discusied in Park 11, supra note 1, at 810-12.58 See Zenni, 492 F. Supp. at 465; Park II, supra note 1, at 810-12; see also infra note
72. 59 See supra note 55. The common law approach, exemplified in Baron Parke's opinion
in Wright v. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Ex. Ch. 1837), aff'd 47 Rev. Rep. 136 (I.L.
1838), would exclude as hearsay evidence offered to prove the truth of a matter explicitly or
impliedly asserted. Tatham involved a will contest in which the mental competency of the
decedent was an issue. See id. at 488. Letters written to the decedent by third parties were
offered as evidence in support of the decedent's competency. See id. at 489. Because the way
in which the letters were written indicated that the writers believed the decedent was mentally
competent, the proponent of the evidence wanted this belief and competency itself to be
inferred from the letters. See id. at 493-95. However, the court ruled the letters to be
hearsay. See also Park II, supra note 1, at 788-93 (explaining the factual and common law
background of Tatham).
60 See Park II, supra note 1, at 810-13 (discussing the recent cases explicitly treating
implied assertions as nonhearsay); see also Zenni, 492 F. Supp. at 466-69 (cited and
discussed in Park I1, supra note 1, at 810-13). But see Wellborn, supra note 1, at 66.
Professor Wellborn has pointed out that certain dangers are actually more likely to arise in the
case of an implied assertion than in a direct assertion:
Thus, a declarant's out-of-court statement "I shot X" is hearsay; but the statement, "I
never did think that X had much longer to live" is not hearsay even though both may be
used to prove the same fact and even though both rest upon the reliability of the same
mental processes, with one exception. The implied assertion requires a guess as to what
the declarant really believed and for that reason may be less reliable than the hearsay
statement.
Id. at 66 n.94 (citation omitted).
61 See Zenni, 492 F. Supp. at 466 n.7; see also Park II, supra note 1, at 811;
Weissenberger, Unintended Implications, supra note 1, at 861 (arguing that such statements
are not subject to conscious insincerity unless analysis is strained to assume that it is the
implied message that is sought to be misleading).
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courts often find implied assertions likely to have enhanced accuracy.62
Although isolated examples can be hypothesized which would refute the
generalization that the declarant usually does not intend messages implied from
primary communications to be relied upon, it appears that courts have realized
that, in the main; it is better to admit out-of-court implied assertions than to
have no evidence at all.63
Some scholars have questioned the wisdom of the contemporary position of
admitting implied assertions. They argue that implied assertions are
insufficiently reliable to be admitted, which is consistent with the common law
analysis.64 Focusing on the derivative quality of an implied assertion, these
scholars argue that the logical possibility of conscious falsification in the
primary assertion inevitably infects the reliability of the assertion implied from
it.65 According to this position, the "assertion-oriented" definition of hearsay in
Rule 801 is inadequate and inferior. 66 Accordingly, these scholars prefer a
"declarant-oriented" approach which focuses on the source of the evidence.
Because the declarant is not subject to the usual safeguards attending courtroom
evidence, the declarant-oriented approach would, consistent with the common
law, find implied assertions inadmissible. 67
My own position, which has been the subject of a prior article,68 is that
some implied assertions should be admitted and some should not.69 I have
62 See Weissenberger, Unintended Implications, supra note 1, at 861; Weissenberger,
Hearsay Puzzles, supra note 21, at 148-49.
63 See Park I, supra note 1, at 52. Critics of Rule 801 would dispute the contention that
the hearsay dangers are magically minimized in admitting implied assertions. The letters in
Tathamn, 112 Eng. Rep. at 488, for example, if admitted to show the competence of the
testator, could still pose dangers. The writers may have known that the testator or recipient
was not in full control of his faculties, and yet nevertheless they may have written to him as if
he were so as not to offend. See Seidelson, supra note 1, at 757.
64 See Rice, supra note 1, at 534; Seidelson, supra note 1, at 575. Professor Rice argues
that an implied assertion is only as credible as the direct assertion from which it is inferred.
Professor Rice uses the example of a will contest where the deceased's verbal statement, "my
nephew John is the most attentive and caring member of the family" is offered to show
fondness for John. Admissible under Rule 801, Professor Rice argues that the statement could
have been made satirically, and accordingly the implied assertion of fondness is completely
unwarranted. See id. at 534. I tend to agree. See Weissenberger, Unintended Implications,
supra note 1, at 860-62.
65 See Rice, supra note 1, at 534-35; Seidelson, supra note 1, at 757; Weissenberger,
Unintended Implications, supra note 1, at 860-62. But see Park II, supra note 1, for a
discussion of reasons to retain the assertion-oriented definition.
66 See Rice, supra note 1, at 532; Seidelson, supra note 1, at 774-75.67 See Rice, supra note 1, at 531-32.
68 See Weissenberger, Unintended Implications, supra note 1, at 857.
69 See id. at 861.
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suggested, and continue to maintain, that there is a class of implied assertions
for which the hearsay dangers are all but nonexistent.70 These are implied
assertions derived from primary utterances which are not factually assertive. 71
In other words, where the primary message cannot, by its nature, be true or
false, the implied assertion should be admitted.72 Utterances in this category are
not likely to be consciously infected by a sincerity defect, and consequently, the
implied message possesses enhanced reliability.73 Take, for example, the out-
of-court statement, "Put two dollars on Paul Revere in the third at Pimlico,"
offered for the implied assertion that the declarant is calling a place where bets
are made. As the primary utterance is not factually assertive (it simply is
incapable of being true or false), there is a substantial reduction in the risk of
insincerity and inaccuracy in the implied assertion. By comparison, primary
utterances which are factually assertive (i.e., capable of being true or false),
remain susceptible to the insincerity danger and should not be admissible bases
for implied assertions. 74 As scholars have argued, where a declarant's primary
70 See id. at 861-62.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 862. The following examples are illustrative:
PRIMARY COMMUNICATION IMPLIED ASSERTION
"Put two dollars on Paul Revere in the third at I am calling a place where
Pinlico.'$ bets can be made.
"Is John at home?" I am calling [or at the door
of] the place where John
lives.
"Don't stick your hand in the disposal." Disposals can harm your
hand.
"Treat Ralph with penicillin" Ralph has a bacterial
(statement by treating physician). infection.
73 See id. at 861. The only way for these primary utterances to be infected with a
sincerity defect is in the unlikely event the declarant intended to lie via the implied message.
See id. For example, if the callers in Zenni who gave directions for placing bets intended to
frame the defendant as a bookmaker, then the sincerity issue is raised. However, it is my
contention that although possible, this is also highly unlikely, and consequently, admission of
the evidence is justified. See id. at 861-62.
74 See id. at 862; see also Rice, supra note 1, at 538. It should be noted that some
statements that appear to fall in this category still pose some increased hearsay dangers. Thus,
the question "Et tu Brute?" offered to show that Brutus was an assailant of Caesar creates an
intriguing problem. See Mueller, supra note 1, at 418 (refuting the idea that all imperatives
and questions are nonassertive and thus nonhearsay). The dying words of Caesar could very
well be admitted under the title nonassertive, though this appears to clearly implicate Brutus,
a factual assertion. See id.; see also Park II, supra note 1, at 795-96 (noting the problem with
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statement may be infected with insincerity, then all implied messages derived
from that statement may be likewise infected.75 For example, the statement,
"[m]y nephew, John, is the most attentive and caring member of the family," 76
could give rise to the implied assertion that the declarant was fond of John.
However, if the declarant's statement was calculatedly insincere or satirical,
then fondness could not be accurately derived or inferred from the declarant's
statement.
77
The foregoing is an extremely abbreviated analysis of the function of the
hearsay definition and the scholarly debate it has engendered, and it is not
meant to substitute for the actual study of the pertinent literature. The debate
among scholars over the interpretation of Rule 801 is extensive in volume and
diversity of positions. 78 At a minimum, this debate illuminates the absence of a
common interpretation of the very Rule which is designed to define hearsay. 79
The Rule is deceptively complex, and in its complexity it relies upon intricate
sub-definitions of "statement," "intend," "verbal," "assertion," "truth," and
"declarant," some of which are expressly codified in the Federal Rules and
some of which are not. 80 It likewise relies upon the context of a long history of
common law development, without which the rule would be indecipherable. 81
Despite the fact that it has attracted extensive analysis and criticism, the
contemporary hearsay system, including the design of the hearsay definition, is
a largely unmodified product of the historical evolution of the common law.8 2
Seemingly, the common law developed by building on the keystone concept of
the definition of hearsay in a way which symbolically reminded lawyers and
the generalization that all imperatives and questions are nonassertive and therefore
admissible). But see EDWARD J. I wfELRmD, EvIDENmARY FOUNDATIONS 235 (1980)
(stating that "[a]s a practical matter, only declarative sentences ordinarily fall within the
hearsay definition").
75 See supra note 64. This argument is persuasive when applied to primary utterances
which are indeed factually assertive, but it cannot apply when the primary message does not
attempt to assert anything. See Weissenberger, Unintended Implications, supra note 1.
76 Rice, supra note 1, at 534.
77 See id.
7 8 See sources cited supra note 1.
79 See id.
80 See discussion of implied assertions supra notes 55-77 and accompanying text.
81 See discussion of reformist efforts supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text.
82 Rule 801, like the common law ban against hearsay, acts as an exclusionary rule used
to prevent the admission of out-of-court statements which are likely tainted by hearsay
dangers. See Park 11, supra note 1, at 785 n.15 (discussing hearsay dangers and various
authors' analyses and terminology regarding them). For a discussion of the development of
the hearsay system under the common law and the Federal Rules of Evidence, see supra notes
32-41 and accompanying text
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judges that the hearsay system is bent upon distinguishing between reliable and
unreliable statements. In its complexity and density, the definition seems to
whisper the message that distinguishing between reliable and unreliable out-of-
court statements is not a simple matter. Despite its simple appearance, the
hearsay definition has evolved to the point of being an overburdened
construct. 8
3
The goal of the reform I propose is to make the rule more reflective of the
process that should logically and rhetorically occur when the definition is
applied, thereby allowing lawyers to make more precise arguments and judges
to make more soundly-based decisions.
IV. PROPOSED REFORM
In order to reform the definition of hearsay, I would make two major
changes. First, I would recast the structure of the applicable rules to reflect the
functional operation of the hearsay system in the courtroom. Second, I would
unpack and make explicit the obscure subtleties of admissibility and
inadmissibility contained in the overladened definition of hearsay. As part of
this second change, I would once-and-for-all definitively resolve the disputes
probably more interesting to scholars than to lawyers and judges as to the
admissibility of implied assertions.
Using the Federal Rules of Evidence as a common frame of reference, the
83 Apparently, the density of the hearsay definition is at times lost on courts. In addition
to attracting voluminous scholarly literature, the hearsay definition has engendered
inconsistent judicial applications. See Welborn, supra note 1, at 83. Wellborn examined
several cases that required an analysis of the hearsay definition with respect to implied
assertions. In one case, United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1222 (1st Cir. 1979),
the court cited Rule 801 and Wright v. Tathan in the same sentence, "without any hint of
inconsistency between the two." Wellborn, supra note 1, at 89. Other cases cited by
Wellborn to illustrate judicial interpretations of Rule 801 include United States v. Perez, 658
F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1978); United States
v. Snow, 517 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1975); Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519
F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1974); Park v.
Huff, 493 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1974), withdrawn on other grounds, 506 F.2d 849 (en banc).
See Wellborn, supra note 1, at 83-91. While some courts have strictly applied the Rule,
classifying any expressions besides direct assertions as nonhearsay, other courts have
followed the traditional common law approach more closely. See id. at 89. Undoubtedly, the
primary reason for the inconsistency is that judges and lawyers are not conversant with the
intricacies and subtle nuances of Rule 801. Judges are required to make spontaneous decisions
regarding admissibility, and if the Rule provides inadequate guidance, judges will likely rely
on "sound instincts" rather than unpacking the logic of the definition each time it is applied.
See id. at 83.
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first step would be to erase completely the existing definition of hearsay in Rule
801. In its place would be a simple rule which would make all out-of-court
statements presumptively inadmissible regardless of whether "offered for their
truth." As a further initial simplification, the term "statement" would be defined
as anything intended to be communicative. 84 As exceptions to this basic rule of
exclusion, I would expressly codify traditional nonhearsay bases of admissibility
such as "verbal act" and "effect on the listener." And rather than leaving the
matter of implied assertions to elusive interpretations of terminology, I would
expressly codify exactly what types of implied assertions are admissible.8
5 I
would retain all of the traditional bases of admissibility delineated in Rules
801(d), 803, and 804. Though perhaps radical at first glance, this proposal does
not dramatically change the end result of applying the current version of Rule
801. It merely explodes the definition into its constituent parts with the aim of
better framing argumentation about admissibility. 86
I will make no attempt here to draft the actual language of the definitions,
the basic rule of exclusion, and the exceptions identifying the classes of
admissible out-of-court statements. Such an exercise might be illustrative, but it
84 This particular definition closely resembles that advocated by Professor Wellborn. See
Wellborn, supra note 1, at 92. Wellborn's approach is good because it eliminates the tortured
analysis used by courts to determine whether a statement was intended as an assertion, an
analysis which requires a compound inquiry of intent to communicate plus an examination of
the purpose for which the evidence is offered. Note that expanding the rule so that all
expressions intended to be communicative come within the category of presumptively
inadmissible out-of-court statements does not lead to the result that these statements will not
be admitted; this is merely the first step of the analysis. See infra note 86 and accompanying
text.
Placing the burden on the proponent of the statement does represent a departure from the
current system which seems to label out-of-court statements as presumptively admissible.
"This rule is so worded as to place the burden upon the party claiming that the intention
existed; ambiguous and doubtful cases will be resolved against him and in favor of
admissibility." FED. R. Evlm. 801(a) advisory committee's note. For a discussion of the issue
of burdens, see infra notes 101-26 and accompanying text.
85 While my own view is that the Rules should specify that certain implied assertions are
admissible, see supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text, the implied assertion issue should
be resolved in any event.
86 Thus the verbal expression "Is John at home?" is admissible under both systems.
Under Rule 801 a court would likely rule that because it is used as an implied assertion that
John lives there, it is not a statement, nor is it offered for its truth. In any event, it would be
classified "nonhearsay." Under the proposal, this would be a statement since it is intended to
be communicative, and would be presumptively inadmissible. The proponent could then offer
as a basis for admission that, because the statement is not a factually assertive statement-that
is, it cannot by its nature be true or false-it possesses enhanced reliability and admission is
justified. See Weissenberger, Unintended Implications, supra note 1, at 861.
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is beside the point. Rather, the point is that it would be beneficial to make
explicit what is now only cryptically implicit in the definition of hearsay, and a
logical scheme is necessary to provide the framework for such a codification.
In advancing this logical framework, I do not wish to minimize the task of
drafting the language of the reformed codification. Nevertheless, just as each of
the common law hearsay exceptions was translated into a neat one or two
sentence exception in Rules 803 and 804, each of the common law bases for
concluding that a statement is "nonhearsay" could be expressed in a similar
compact category exception delimiting admissibility. 87  Likewise, the
admissibility of certain, but not necessarily all, implied assertions could be
circumscribed by an exception. 88 Finally, this codification would not be
complete without a recognition that there are statements which defy such
categorization as, for example, a "verbal act," but which nevertheless should be
considered admissible.89 Borrowing once again from Rules 803 and 804, I
would utilize a "catch-all" or "residual" exception such as those codified in
Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) to address these statements. Admittedly, the
wording would be difficult because absent extreme care, the host of problems
that presently reside in the existing codification of definitions in Rule 801 would
reemerge under this residual exception. Thankfully, the problems would be
reduced to a much smaller horizon of instances, but reducing the problems does
not make them go away entirely. Recognizing these problems, here is how I
would conceptually construct the residual exception: I would embrace a
"declarant-oriented" approach and thereby compel the proponent of the
statement (the party using the exception) to argue that the use of the statement
does not rely upon the declarant's sincerity or powers of narration, perception,
87 See Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 53 OHmo ST. L.J. 1307, 1320-21 (1992) (explaining that the Federal Rules
of Evidence "were promulgated pursuant to congressional enabling authority" but "originated
in the judicial branch of government"). According to one of the authors of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, "[i]n reality... the body of common law knowledge [of evidence] continues to
exist, though in the somewhat altered form of a source of guidane... ." Id. at 1331
(quoting Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB.
L. REv. 908, 915 (1978)). Just as the current provisions of the Federal Rules incorporate the
common law, so could other features of the common law be incorporated into the Rules. For
example, the language, "a statement containing words having independent legal significance,"
could be incorporated.
88 For example, an exception could provide for the admissibility of messages implied
from out-of-court statements which are not fact-assertive. See supra notes 68-72 and
accompanying text.
89 See 2 McCoRmcK, supra note 1, § 249; WEssEBERGER, supra note 38, § 801.8;
Park II, supra note 1, at 833-34, 836.
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and memory. 90 Consequently, in the small number of instances where a
statement fails to fit within a codified category of statements that have been
traditionally designated as nonhearsay, I would channel the rhetoric to the
underlying theory of the distinction between hearsay and nonhearsay. 91
Having been sweepingly presented with a grand scheme of reform, please
endure some comments about its virtues. A significant benefit of my
codification is that it obviates the problem of categorizing certain statements as
"admissible nonhearsay" because they are not offered for their truth or because
they are not intended as assertions.92 Also, it sequences the analysis of its
application in a manner that is subject to more comprehensible progression and
more precise and logical argumentation. For example, under my reform a court
would easily evaluate the statement, "Put two dollars on Paul Revere in the
third at Pimlico." It is a verbal expression intended to be communicative and is
thus presumptively inadmissible. Next, the proponent would show the court
why this statement should nevertheless come in under an exception to the
exclusionary rule. The proponent would not try to place the expression outside
the definition through incantation of the phrase, "implied assertions" or "not
offered for its truth."93 Instead of attempting to circumnavigate the definition of
hearsay, the proponent would be affirmatively required to follow a logical
progression of reasoning and argumentation by bearing the burden of satisfying
an express basis for admissibility.94 It is my contention that my rule would
90 See Park II, supra note 1, at 785-86.
91 Under my scheme, the existing residual exceptions in Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5)
would be retained and available to apply to situations where sincerity, narration, perception,
or memory are reduced because of circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
92 Under Rule 801, only oral or written assertions, or nonverbal conduct intended by the
declarant as an assertion are statements. See FED. R. EvID. 801(a). Hearsay is then defined as
a "statement... offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." F D. R. Evm.
801(c). This codification requires that the out-of-court behavior first be evaluated to see if it is
a statement (i.e., assertive) and then to see if it is offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
93 This is not to say that all arguments regarding implied assertions are obviated, but at
least they are not present in the first step of defining an out-of-court statement. See supra
notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
94 Professor McElhaney has noted:
That thicket of endless possibilities is what makes the buzzwords "not for its truth"
so attractive. Some lawyers figure they can lose the judge and the other lawyer in the
bushes, wondering what the evidence really proves.
And it's amazing how often it works. Caught in the tangle of awkward phrases and
endless possibilities, some lawyers and judges would rather pretend that they, too, like
the way the emperor is dressed, instead of confessing they don't see what he's got on. It
is a trap for the intellectually insecure who do not want to appear as if they don't
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channel the rhetoric in a more constructive fashion.95
Finally, it might be asked why I have selected the so-called "declarant-
oriented" approach for my catch-all or residual basis for admitting out-of-court
statements that currently elude a traditional category of nonhearsay and yet
should be admitted. My answer is both simple and not quite so simple. The
simple answer is that I am an evidence professor, and as such, I inevitably
favor a declarant-oriented approach to hearsay because it captures the theory
underpinning the system. But that answer is too quick (but in large part true
nonetheless). Less simply, however, I have elected to use the declarant-oriented
approach for this purpose because the declarant-oriented approach would be
universally considered superior due to the fact that it captures the pivotal policy
of hearsay were it not for two problems: first, it is excessively restrictive in
certain contexts; and second, it is difficult to apply because it requires too much
understanding of the theory supporting the hearsay system. 96 In large measure,
my codification ameliorates these concerns. First, the arguable restrictiveness of
the declarant-oriented approach lies in its treatment of virtually all implied
assertions as hearsay. 97 My codification would make admissible certain implied
assertions where it is highly unlikely that the implied message is infected with
insincerity, thus diminishing the harshness of the declarant-oriented approach. 98
Second, by virtue of my overall codification scheme, the use of the declarant-
oriented analysis would rarely be necessary. 99 In most situations the category
exceptions would be employed to admit out-of-court statements that historically
have been considered admissible nonhearsay. It is only where a statement does
not fit a category exception, and the proponent is seeking admission in what
would be described under the present system as "nonhearsay," that the residual
basis would be invoked. In this relatively rare context, if the proponent cannot
articulate a plausible declarant-oriented basis for admitting the statement, it
should be excluded unless it achieves admissibility pursuant to Rules 803
and 804 due to traditional notions of circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.100
understand.
McElhaney, supra note 13, at 82.
95 See Park II, supra note 1, at 802-04 & n.84 (noting that very few courts have
discussed the issue of implied assertions).96 See Park H, supra note 1. Park explains that "rigorous application of the declarant
definition would require that certain reliable utterances that are now admissible as nonhearsay
find a new route to admission." Id. at 784.
97 See id.
98 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
99 See supra note 83.
100 Such "declarant-oriented" reasons focus on the reliability of the declarant.
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V. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The question naturally arises whether my proposed system would effect
changes that would alter the burdens placed on the proponent and the opponent
of "out-of-court statement" evidence such that some important balance in the
current system is disturbed. It is my contention that, ultimately, this apparent
alteration of burdens is illusory, and what is effected in actuality is a desirable
sequencing of argumentation.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, as under most evidence systems, the
proponent of evidence bears the burden of demonstrating the relevancy of the
evidence. 10 1 Once relevancy has been established (and in many cases it is so
self-apparent that no argumentation is necessary), the burden is then on the
opponent of the evidence to substantiate an objection if the opponent wishes to
exclude the evidence. 1°2 Accordingly, under current practice pursuant to the
Federal Rules, if the opponent of relevant evidence wishes to exclude evidence
on the basis of hearsay, the opponent is required to demonstrate that the
evidence in question is hearsay under the definition of Rule 801(c). In order to
substantiate this ostensive burden, the opponent must demonstrate not only that
the proponent is offering an out-of-court statement, as "statement" is defined in
Rule 801(a), 103 but also that the relevant purpose for which the proponent is
offering the evidence depends upon the truthfulness of the out-of-court
statement. 04 If the opponent fails in substantiating his or her position, then the
objection fails, and the relevant evidence is admitted. 105 If the opponent
establishes to the judge's satisfaction that the evidence is hearsay, the burden
then shifts back to the proponent to show that some basis for admitting the
101 This burden is derived from the basic requirements of Rules 401 and 402. See FED.
R. EvID. 401,402.
102 See generally 1 McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 52, at 204 ("The precept constantly
urged is that objections must be accompanied by a reasonably definite statement of the
grounds, that is to say, that objections must reasonably indicate the appropriate rules of
evidence as reasons for the objections made.").
103 See FED. R. EviD. 801.
104 See FED. R. EviD. 801(c).
105 In other words, the hearsay objection might be overruled because the trial judge
concludes that the evidence is not an out-of-court statement, or because it is an out-of-court
statement, but it is not offered for its truth. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654,
659 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the defendant's phone conversation was used only to show
the defendant's involvement with the conspiracy, not for the truth of what was said); United
States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464, 469 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (holding that the statement, "Put $2
on Paul Revere in the third at Pimlico," was not offered for its truth because it was a direction
and could not be true or false).
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hearsay exists. 106
Under the system that I am proposing, the basic relevancy burden is, of
course, still inescapably on the proponent. However, if the opponent seeks to
exclude relevant evidence that involves an out-of-court statement, he or she
would only need to show that the proponent is indeed offering an out-of-court
"statement" as defined in the rule (i.e., that the behavior of the declarant is
intended to be communicative). Once the opponent establishes that the
proponent is offering an out-of-court statement, the burden would then shift
back to the proponent of the evidence to demonstrate that the out-of-court
statement fits within some category of admissibility. 107
The most substantial procedural change of my system would appear to arise
when what would be termed under the current system "a nonhearsay out-of-
court statement" is sought to be introduced. My proposed system appears to
involve an alteration of the traditional allocation of burdens in the context of
identifying which out-of-court statements are admissible because, under current
analysis, they are not "offered for their truth." Under the Federal Rules, the
proponent need only show relevancy, and it is the opponent who bears the
burden of substantiating the hearsay objection.108 The opponent must show that
the out-of-court behavior is a statement and that it is offered for its truth in
order to substantiate his or her objection. Under my proposed system, the
proponent would be required to show relevancy, as under the Federal Rules.
But if the opponent objects and shows that the evidence offered is an out-of-
court statement (i.e., intended to be communicative), the burden would then
shift back to the proponent to substantiate a basis for admissibility.
Consequently, in the current "nonhearsay out-of-court statement" context, the
burden in my system is on the proponent to show the statement falls within an
admissible category such as "verbal act," "effect on listener," "admissible
implied assertion," and so forth.109
Before addressing the concern that this alteration of the existing allocation
of procedural burdens would result in insurmountable problems, I will identify
and dispose of a slightly more subtle issue, that involving nonverbal conduct
intended as an assertion. Under existing practice, when conduct is offered as
106 These bases include the exceptions to the definition contained in Rule 801(d), the
exceptions codified in Rules 803 and 804, and other bases identified in Rule 802.107 The system would expressly identify the traditional categories of nonhearsay out-of-
court statements as bases for admission. Other bases for admitting out~of-court statements
would include the traditional exceptions now codified in Rules 803 and 804.108 See supra note 101-05 and accompanying text.
109My system's modification of burdens would not change the burdens regarding other
bases of admitting out-of-court statements such as those contained in Rules 801(d), 803, or
804.
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evidence and is objected to as hearsay, it is necessary to determine whether an
assertion was intended by the actor (potential declarant), and, consequently,
whether the assertion meets the definition of a statement contained in Rule
801(a).1 0 The proponent of the evidence has the initial minimal burden of
identifying the conduct to be proven and the relevancy of it.III If the trial judge
concludes that the conduct is not intended as an assertion, then the burden shifts
to the opponent of the evidence to show otherwise. n 2 The conduct situation is
slightly different from the verbal one in that conduct is less likely than the
spoken word to be intended as an assertion. For this reason, the common
procedure in the context of nonverbal conduct has created something of a
presumption in favor of the proponent of the evidence that the conduct is not
assertive. This pseudo-presumption stems from the fact that it is the opponent of
the evidence that shows that the conduct is intended to be communicative."
3
My proposed system would really have no effect on this procedure. The
informal presumption remains since the burden is now totally on the objecting
party to show that the proponent of the evidence is introducing an out-of-court
"statement."11 4 In order to show that the conduct amounts to a "statement," the
objecting party must show that the conduct is intended to be communicative.115
Consequently, once the proponent meets his or her initial relevancy burden, it
would still be incumbent on the objecting party to show that the conduct is a
statement (i.e., communicative) and thus inadmissible unless some basis for
admissibility can be shown. Although the primary objective of my proposal is
to make the proponent effectively more responsible for the rationale for
admitting the evidence he or she introduces, the objecting party must be able to
bear the burden of proving that the proposed evidence is a statement (i.e., that it
is communicative). Just as under the current system, this burden would be more
difficult when dealing with nonverbal conduct than with spoken words.
With verbal conduct, however, the informal presumption of admissibility
110 See 4 WENns & BERGER, supra note 1, 801(a)[02], at 801-67.
111 See id.
112 See id. For example, an accused defendant, D, presents testimony that another
person, X, fled the crime scene as soon as the crime occurred. D does not present the
evidence as an assertion on X's part, but its relevancy attaches to its mere occurrence. If the
prosecution, P, objects to this testimony being admitted by claiming that X purposely fled the
scene so that suspicion would not be drawn to D, but to X instead, P should have the burden
of establishing that fact. See Maguire, supra note 1, at 766.
113 See FED. R. EvD. 801(a) advisory committee's note. This method of procedure in
the hearsay system is proposed by Maguire. See Maguire, supra note 1, at 769.
114 See FED. R. EviD. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
115 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed definition of
statement).
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which attaches to nonverbal conduct does not exist under current practice. 116
Spoken words rely on context and tone of voice, among other things, for their
true meanings. Accordingly, under my proposed system, when an objection is
raised and the issue arises as to whether a verbal utterance is a statement (i.e.,
intended as a communication), both arguments would be heard and all
preliminary evidence proffered before an evidentiary ruling would be made. 11
7
Consistent with current practice, judges would simply ask for the arguments
from both sides under no formal procedural method and then make a
decision. 118 The judge would weigh the opponent's objection that the proponent
is introducing an out-of-court statement, and if the objection is sustained, it
would be the proponent's burden to show that the statement is admissible under
one of the express category exceptions. 119
When an "out-of-court statement" is introduced, it has always been well
116 If anything, the reverse may be present. With the procedural burden on the
proponent of the evidence, the evidence is technically and presumptively inadmissible.117 Consistent with courtroom experience, there is little reason to conclude this is not the
way decisions are typically made regarding hearsay in actual, current practice. "It can
scarcely be doubted that an assertion made in words is intended by the declarant to be an
assertion. Hence, verbal assertions readily fall into the category of 'statement."' FED. R.
EviD. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
118 In many situations, the judge asks the proponent of the evidence for an offer of proof
following the opponent's objection. This offer is to determine whether or not the statement is
being offered for its truth (and thus hearsay) or not for its truth (and thus nonhearsay).
Although technically the offer of proof is used only to establish the proponent's argument
concerning the evidence for appeal purposes, it is apparently also used by judges in the
decisionmaling process. See 1 McCoRMcK, supra note 1, § 51, at 195-96. The typical use
of an offer of proof is found in United States v. Hansbrough, 450 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1971). In
this case, the district court judge allowed testimony that had been objected to as hearsay. See
id. at 329. On appeal, the circuit court upheld the decision based on the district court's finding
that the statement was offered to prove a "verbal act" and therefore was not hearsay. See id.
A more revealing case as to how an offer of proof is used at the trial level is United States v.
Payden, 622 F. Supp 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Here, the trial judge requested an offer of proof
from the proponent of the evidence before making a ruling on its admissibility, thus allowing
the judge to weigh the arguments of the opponent and the proponent in order to decide. See
id. at 917. In effect, this impliedly placed the burden of proof on the proponent of the
evidence since the opponent's objection argument needed to be rebutted.
119 No longer would the opponent illogically try to prove something he or she really
does not know (i.e., the true motive of the proponent of the evidence). If, however, the
opponent comes up with an alternate theory as to the proponent's true motive or purpose for
introducing the out-of-court statement that would make it inadmissible, the opponent must
substantiate his or her argument. My proposed rule would not change this practice in reality,
because the opponent is in effect becoming the proponent of his or her theory and, therefore,
must bear the burden of persuading the court to adopt it.
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understood that the proponent of the evidence has the burden of proving not
only its relevancy, but also, where the statement satisfies the definition of
hearsay, that the evidence falls into one of the hearsay exceptions. 120
Nevertheless, before and after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
when an out-of-court statement is a "nonhearsay out-of-court statement," there
has been no long-standing tradition as to whether the proponent or opponent
bears the burden of showing this proposition (i.e., showing that the statement is
not offered for its truth because it is, for example, a "verbal act" or an "implied
assertion," or is offered for its effect on the listener).' 21 Intuitively, it would
appear that the burden of showing the statement's nonhearsay quality would be
upon the proponent. But technically, substantiating that the statement is "offered
for its truth" might appear to fall upon the party asserting the hearsay objection.
In the blur of reality, the trial judge simply hears both sides (generally requiring
the proponent of the evidence to provide a strong argument for admission), and
then rules without regard to formal burdens. 122 Accordingly, by placing the
burden to demonstrate admissibility on the proponent of the evidence after the
opponent has substantiated an objection by demonstrating that a statement is
offered, my proposed rule should not have any substantial effect on traditional
courtroom procedure other than to further shape the way in which the argument
might sequentially proceed at trial. 123
120 These hearsay exceptions include exceptions contained in Rules 801(d), 803, and
804, as well as other bases identified in Rule 802. See FED R. EvlD. 801(d), 802, 803, 804;
see also Maguire, supra note 1, at 769 (proposing an entire hearsay system based on the
Uniform Rules of Evidence that specifically embraces the proponent's burden of classifying
the hearsay statement into an admissible exception).
121 The issue lies in determining whether it is the opponent's task to prove that the
statement is hearsay, or the proponent's task to show that it is not. There is very little
documentation regarding the burden of proving that an out-of-court statement is or is not
offered for its truth. Obviously, trial courts do not detail the procedure when writing their
decisions, and even the authors of major evidence treatises (Lilly, Mueller & Kirkpatrick,
McCormick, Weinstein, and Wigmore) neglect to discuss the Rule or reality differences of
these procedural burdens.
122 See Wellborn, supra note 1, at 89.
123 1 should acknowledge that by placing this burden on the proponent, it may be
arguably more difficult for a criminal defendant to introduce relevant evidence in certain
contexts. Although this effect could create a constitutional dilemma regarding the due process
rights of the accused, the Supreme Court's treatment of cases involving the admissibility of
out-of-court statements in the criminal defense context eliminates this possibility. See Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (lowering the standard for determining trustworthiness by
invalidating the state's per se rule which disallowed the defendant's hypnotically refreshed
testimony); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (allowing the hearsay testimony
because of assurances of trustworthiness and to ensure the defendant's right to due process).
Analyzed together, these two cases illustrate the evolution of a doctrine that allows a criminal
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Finally, there is an argument that my proposal would not really change any
of the pertinent burdens in the existing system. This argument is based in the
logic of the system itself, and it is predicated on a recognition that when a
proponent offers an out-of-court statement on a nonhearsay basis under existing
practice, he or she must initially show relevancy in order to satisfy Rules 401
and 402.124 As a part of this relevancy burden, the proponent of traditional
nonhearsay out-of-court statements must show that the statement offered is not
relevant for its truthfulness but relevant in some other way. Consequently, if the
"not offered for its truth" quality of an out-of-court statement is seen as
logically part of the relevancy burden, my system does not modify the existing
burdens under the Federal Rules. 125
VI. CONCLUSION
If this Article had been written while the Federal Rules of Evidence were
being formulated, would I believe that my suggestions for codification might be
seriously considered as a model for the Rules? Do I believe that this Article
might inspire amendments to the Federal Rules? Might states considering the
adoption of the Federal Rules as their evidence code take my approach and
substitute it for Federal Rule 801? These are entertaining fantasies, but they
really are not what this Article is about. Also, in the main, this Article is not
about hearsay reform. Other articles have charted this territory by focusing on
which forms of evidence should be admissible and which should not. 126 This
Article is different.
Also, this Article is not about real lawyers and real judges and what is
really good for them in real courtrooms. As evidence professors, we can look
at reported decisions and glean some notion of what transpires in such
courtrooms, but our perspective is limited. The vast majority of evidence law is
practiced orally without a trace of a written opinion. Consequently, there may
defendant to override the evidentiary limitations of the common law and the statutory hearsay
rules. See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 539-48.124 See FED. R. EvD. 401,402.
125 The preceding offer of proof discussion, supra note 118, may apply to this argument.
As previously mentioned, when the offer of proof is used in regard to evidence objected to as
hearsay, it is generally used to determine whether the statement is offered for its truth. As
much as this question is determinative of hearsay, it is also determinative of relevancy in
many instances.
126 Other articles take a similar approach. See Graham, supra note 1, at 900-23;
Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. Rnv. 957, 961-69, 971-74 (1974).
Admittedly, I have taken a position on specific points including the admissibility of implied
assertions (because I believe a codification should address them) and, in a narrow context, the
declarant-oriented approach to hearsay.
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well be an unfounded arrogance in recommending a reconstruction of a system
where the active participants are not seeking change.
This Article, rather than a call for change, is much more an allegory about
change. Basically, the moral of this story is that if a truly workable codification
of the hearsay system were sought, it would be necessary to think long, hard,
and clearly about a number of subtle and intricate concepts. Moreover, if
precision in that workable codification were sought, then the codification should
not merely gather up and embrace the imprecise and elusive terminology of the
common law 127
Ultimately, this Article is about the kinds of changes that were not made
when the Federal Rules of Evidence were drafted.
127 See generally Glen Weissenberger, Are the Federal Rules of Evidence a Statute?, 55
OHIo ST. L.J. 393 (1994).
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